Claudine Gay at the Congressional hearing |
It is widely believed that their testimony before a
Congressional committee last month was evasive, even mendacious and/or
anti-Semitic. Curmie, you may recall,
disagreed with those conclusions, and noted that both Eugene Volokh and FIRE’s legal director, Will Creeley,
agree with his assessment. Context does
matter.
The specific circumstances surrounding a demonstration by
supporters of the Palestinian cause chanting “from the river to the sea” are
central to determining the appropriate response. That phrase has been interpreted by some to
mean the extermination of Israel, or even of Jews in general. Others claim the slogan suggests merely an
aspiration to be liberated from what Palestinians perceive, not altogether
inaccurately, as Israeli oppression, with no inherent suggestion of violence.
Analogously: a swastika—the word is derived from the
Sanskrit for “may all be well with you”—is a positive emblem in several Eastern
religions (especially, but not exclusively, Hindu), but that’s not the first
association 21st-century Americans, especially Jews, will make. Should Hindus be prevented from using a
time-honored symbol of their faith because the Nazis appropriated the
image? No, but circumspection would
certainly be in order. Context!
Back in the Dark Ages of the late 20th century,
Curmie taught courses in public speaking and persuasion. Those courses required examining the
relationship between the sender and the receiver of a message. More specifically, communication theory
suggests that there are innumerable ways in which the process can go wrong. All of us have experienced more than one
episode in which what one person intended to say was not what the other person
heard. These situations, though clearly
unintentional, often lead to tension… or worse.
Volokh, Creeley, and Curmie agree that context matters, that
whether or not demonstrators were engaging in protected (even if objectionable)
speech is a matter of context. If the chants
constitute an actual threat against specific individuals or group, if there is
an incitement to criminality, then First Amendment protections (and their equivalents
at private universities purporting to uphold free speech values) do not
apply. Barring that threat, however, even
offensive speech must be permitted, provided it does not directly violate the
rights (as opposed to the sensibilities) of others.
Curmie has long believed in the “reasonable person”
approach. That is, in this particular matter,
the question is not whether Jewish students at those universities felt
personally threatened, but whether a reasonable person would have interpreted
the actions of the protestors in that way.
And now we’re back at context.
Curmie wasn’t there. Neither,
probably, were you, Gentle Reader. Ultimately,
we’re going to have to trust the people on the ground to make the call. That doesn’t mean they’re necessarily right,
only that we have no other reasonable alternative.
The concept of context takes on another meaning, too, of
course. Here, the issue is not free
speech, but consistency. And here is
where those critical of the responses by various university administrations
across the country have their most persuasive point: what if it were a
different group of students who were offended or felt threatened by the actions
of others?
Curmie has been dismissive here and elsewhere of, for
example, the black student at the University of Michigan who felt “unsafe” when a professor showed the Laurence Olivier film version of Othello
in class, or the Muslim student at Hamline University who purported to feel “unwanted” and “disrespected” when she passed up clearly
stated opportunities to avoid seeing an image of the prophet Muhammad in a
global art history class and would have us believe she was scarred for life.
Curmie mentions these incidents not because they’re silly,
although they are, but because university administrations sided with the
students and their fragile sensibilities: in the former case, a Distinguished
University Professor (note the capital letters: this is an official title) was
humiliated and removed from teaching his course; in the latter case, an adjunct
professor (with a PhD) was de facto fired.
It is not too big a stretch to suggest that had some group
other than Jewish students considered themselves threatened on the Penn or
Harvard campuses, the administrations’ actions might almost certainly
would have been different. In other
words, whereas allowing the pro-Palestinian protests was arguably the correct
call when considered in isolation, in context (there’s that word again!) it could
reasonably be considered a hypocritical violation of the university’s
precedents in order to favor one side of a contentious issue. Are these examples of anti-Semitism? Curmie isn’t saying “yes,” but he isn’t
saying “no,” either.
This critique is especially true at Harvard, where Claudine Gray’s resignation letter includes this tidbit: “it has been distressing to have doubt cast on my
commitments to confronting hate and to upholding scholarly rigor – two bedrock
values that are fundamental to who I am – and frightening to be subjected to
personal attacks and threats fueled by racial animus.”
Yeah, right. Curmie
may agree that responses to campus demonstrations should be based on context,
but she failed to make that case in her appearance before that committee, when either
she knew what questions were coming or was remarkably unprepared. If that performance was “confronting hate,”
Curmie is Miss America. Still, Curmie is
reasonably convinced that Gay would have survived the brouhaha arising from the
congressional testimony had she not been outed as a plagiarist.
As for “scholarly rigor,” well, even her supporters at the Harvard
Crimson admit that “Gay’s behavior constitutes plagiarism” and that “sloppiness of this
kind is unbefitting of a Harvard president.”
Yes, it is true that plagiarism cases are on a continuum, and some
examples are worse than others. But
whereas the lack of intention to deceive is at least a partial excuse for an
undergraduate (Curmie has seen scores of such cases), such a lack of… wait for
it… rigor is unacceptable in a graduate student, let alone the president
of Harvard.
If, as many folks who know the specifics of Harvard’s honor
code better than I have asserted, Gay’s plagiarism was quantitatively and
qualitatively significant enough that a Harvard undergrad would have been
suspended for similar offenses, Gay should be fired, not simply from the
presidency but also as a faculty member.
Nor should anyone else hire her.
Predictably, Gay accepts literally no responsibility for her
actions, resorting instead to claims of racial victimhood. They are bullshit. It may not be true that Gay got the job to
begin with not because she was the best available candidate, but because she
was considered the best available black female candidate (Curmie doubts that
even that description is likely to be true), but it’s difficult to believe
otherwise. And her self-righteous
bluster about “racial animus” only weakens what little case she had.
Dr. Gay, you were de facto removed from the presidency of the nation’s oldest and most famous university because you were proven to be a fraud, even to the satisfaction of many of your supporters. You get to remain in a cushy faculty position, and according to one report will still bring in a salary about a dozen times as high as Curmie’s was when he retired as a full professor. You caught a break, and it’s far more likely that your demographic profile lightened your punishment than that it precipitated it. The wise thing to do would be to STFU. But, of course, if you were actually wise, you wouldn’t be in this position to begin with.
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